Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering by Constraining Partisan Actors

Cory McCartanChristopher T. KennyTyler SimkoEmma EboweMichael Y. ZhaoKosuke ImaiPolMeth XLI • July 18, 2024

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- see, e.g., January 6, 2021



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- **Do reforms work?** So far, correlational evidence only

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 → Multiple outcome measures;
 Redistricting simulation to control for political geography

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Limited data:

n = 43 states; t = 2 periods

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Confounding:

Reformed states skew Democratic

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- → Differences-in-differences design


Introduction **Treatment Modeling Estimation Results Policy Evaluations**


Round 1

Round 2

Stalemate Procedure


Post-Enactment Processes






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
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
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The redistricting game: Pennsylvania




The redistricting game: Pennsylvania



Plan bias = zero-sum utility

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 to 0.0 in 2020 (independent citizen commission)

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- New York: -1.6 in 2020 (commission w/ Dem. veto)

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• Assume institutional features affect outcome only through continuous treatment:

$$Y_{it}(\mathbf{z}) = Y_{it}(\mathbf{z'})$$
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
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
- Want to estimate $CATE_{\mathbf{x}}(d, d') = \mathbf{E}[Y_{i1}(d') Y_{i1}(d) | \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}]$
- Assume **strong parallel trends** to identify CATE for any dosage (Callaway et al., 2024)


$$\mathbf{E}[Y_{i1}(d') - Y_{i0}(d) \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}] = \mathbf{E}[Y_{i1}(d') - Y_{i0}(d) \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}, D_{i0} = d, D_{i1} = d']$$

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


Decreasing leeway reduces partisan bias





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Treatment Modeling Estimation Results **Policy Evaluations**

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
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(1) We evaluate every state adopting this reform from their 2010 process

Reforms improve nationwide partisan symmetry by constraining **Republicans**







Redistricting Reforms



Redistricting Reforms Reduce Gerrymandering





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 - help Democrats, decreasing partisan bias
 - increase responsiveness
- More in the paper!
 - Other outcomes (including partisan symmetry)
 - More reform analyses



Continuous DiD(iD)

- Control for changes political geography using redistricting simulation
- Randomly sampled plans provide a nonpartisan benchmark \widetilde{Y}_{it}
- Additional simulation difference weakens identification condition: Replace $Y_{it}(d)$ with $\Delta Y_{it}(d) = Y_{it}(d) - \tilde{Y}_{it}$

$$\mathbf{E}[\Delta Y_{i1}(d') - \Delta Y_{i0}(d) \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}] = \mathbf{E}[\Delta Y_{i1}(d') - \Delta Y_{i0}(d) \mid \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{D}_{i0} = d, \mathbf{D}_{i1} = d']$$


• Identify CATE as $CATE_{\mathbf{x}}(d, d') = \mathbf{E}[\Delta Y_{i1} - \Delta Y_{i0} | \mathbf{X}_{i} = \mathbf{x}, D_{i0} = d, D_{i1} = d'] - \mathbf{E}[\Delta Y_{i1} - \Delta Y_{i0} | \mathbf{X}_{i} = \mathbf{x}, D_{i0} = d, D_{i1} = d]$

Detailed procedural coding, 2010–2020

State	Year	Drawer	Drawer control	Veto 1	Veto 1 ctrl.	Veto 2	Veto 2 ctrl.	Court review?	Court control	Stalemate 1	Stalemate 1 ctrl.	Stalemate 2	Stalemate 2 ctrl.	Preclearance
Alabama	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Alabama	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arizona	2010	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arizona	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arkansas	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Arkansas	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
California	2010	commission	nonpartisans	voters	NA	NA	NA	yes	republicans	court	democrats	unclear	NA	yes
California	2020	commission	nonpartisans	voters	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	court	republicans	unclear	NA	yes
Colorado	2010	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	court	democrats	unclear	NA	no
Colorado	2020	commission	nonpartisans	court	democrats	NA	NA	yes	democrats	commission staff	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	no
Connecticut	2010	legislature	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	no	democrats	commission	nonpartisans	court	democrats	no
Connecticut	2020	legislature	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	no	democrats	commission	nonpartisans	court	democrats	no
Florida	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Florida	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	yes	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Georgia	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Georgia	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	republicans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes
Hawaii	2010	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Hawaii	2020	commission	nonpartisans	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Idaho	2010	commission	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	republicans	commission	split	unclear	NA	no
Idaho	2020	commission	split	NA	NA	NA	NA	yes	republicans	commission	split	unclear	NA	no
Illinois	2010	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Illinois	2020	legislature	democrats	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Indiana	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	commission	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Indiana	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	maybe	republicans	commission	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Iowa	2010	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	no	republicans	legislature	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Iowa	2020	commission	nonpartisans	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	no	republicans	legislature	republicans	unclear	NA	no
Kansas	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Kansas	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	NA	NA	NA	no	nonpartisans	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Kentucky	2010	legislature	split	governor	democrats	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Kentucky	2020	legislature	republicans	governor	NA	NA	NA	maybe	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	no
Louisiana	2010	legislature	republicans	governor	republicans	NA	NA	no	democrats	unclear	NA	NA	NA	yes


Model-based treatment values

Realized leeway (party-signed treatment)



MI NY VA	A		CT IA KS NE NH NV UT WI WV AL GA LA MS TX			
			Reforms	Legislature +		
				no Court Review		

Treatment model validation



Treatment model validation

- Equilibrium path from game leads to forecast of which body will end up drawing map
- Compare these forecasts to reality
- Good agreement, with tendency of model to over-predict court intervention

	Most likely in equilibrium					
Final drawer	Legislature	Commission	Court	Total		
Legislature	31.9	0.0	19.1	51		
Commission	0.0	18.9	3.0	22		
Court	1.7	0.0	12.3	14		
Total	33.6	18.9	34.4	87		


Estimation

- Bayesian linear regression model
- Response is $\Delta Y_{i1} \Delta Y_{i0}$
- Interact dose (leeway change) with covariates
- Priors for moderate shrinkage


<u>Covariates</u>:

- 2010 leeway
- 2008 Democratic vote share
- Indicator for South
- log(no. of districts in 2020)
- Change in districts 2010–2020
- log(corruption convictions)
- Indicator for ballot initiatives

A menagerie of redistricting processes



The redistricting game: Alabama



Equilibrium = 2.8 / 4 (Republican-favoring)

Reforms reduce gerrymandering and improve nonpartisan outcomes

